Abstract-In this paper, the resource allocation and scheduling problem for a full-duplex (FD) orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access network is studied where an FD base station simultaneously communicates with multiple pairs of uplink (UL) and downlink (DL) half-duplex (HD) users bidirectionally. In this paper, we aim to maximize the network sum-rate through joint UL and DL user pairing, OFDM subchannel assignment, and power allocation. We formulate the problem as a nonconvex optimization problem. The optimal algorithm requires an exhaustive search, which will become prohibitively complicated as the numbers of users and subchannels increase. To tackle this complex problem more efficiently, we formulate the userpairing and subchannel allocation problem as a three-sided matching problem, and propose a novel low-complexity nearoptimal matching algorithm. The algorithm is analyzed, and we prove that it converges to a stable matching. Simulation results show that the FD scheme can significantly improve the spectrum efficiency compared with the HD scheme. The proposed algorithm performs very close to the optimal algorithm, and significantly outperforms other resource allocation schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
T O MEET the rapidly increasing demand for high data rates in the wireless network, various techniques have been proposed to further improve the spectral efficiency, such as small cells and device-to-device communications. However, most existing cellular networks deploy the half-duplex (HD) radios, i.e., the uplink and downlink communication signals are separated by using either time division duplex (TDD) or frequency division duplex (FDD) [2] . Communication between the HD BS and HD users requires dividing the temporal and/or spectral resources into orthogonal resources [3] , i.e., they cannot transmit or receive in a single channel simultaneously.
Though the HD scheme enables a low-complexity system design, the radio resources are underused. To further improve the spectrum efficiency, recently there is a significant progress in full-duplex (FD) radio technology development [4] , which can effectively reduce the self-loop interference to the noise level and achieve the single-band, simultaneous, and bidirectional communication [5] . To exploit the FD technologies in the wireless networks, various challenges such as selfinterference cancellation [6] and FD relaying [7] have been well studied in the literature, making the FD scheme a promising potential to double the spectrum efficiency.
In this paper, we consider an OFDMA-based cellular network where the FD base station (BS) simultaneously communicates with multiple HD uplink (UL) and downlink (DL) users. Different from traditional HD systems in which UL and DL resource allocations are separately performed [8] , [9] , a FD cellular network requires joint UL-DL resource allocation schemes due to the co-existance of UL and DL communications. Therefore, traditional HD UL or DL resource allocation schemes are unlikely to obtain satisfactory system performance, urging new solutions that account for the nature of FD communications.
Recently there are some initial works discussing various resource allocation problems in such FD cellular network [1] , [10] - [13] . In [1] and [10] , the authors aimed to maximize the network total sum-rate, and the problem was formulated as a combinational optimization problem. The resource block (RB) allocation was considered in [11] for a FD cellular network, and the interference between the users was reduced via the RB allocation. In [12] , a two-user FD cellular network was considered, and a non-cooperative game was proposed for radio resource allocation in such networks. In [13] , a power efficient resource allocation algorithm was designed for achieving total transmit power minimization in a FD cellular network.
Most existing works on this topic focus on the subchannel and power allocation problems in the FD cellular network. However, it is also very important to consider UL and DL user pairing, i.e., joint scheduling of UL and DL users. Different from traditional the HD BS, an FD BS is able to schedule an UL and a DL user on the same frequency at the same time, and thus the selection of pairing users is closely coupled with subchannel allocation, together influencing the system performance. In this paper, we consider the joint optimization of UL and DL user pairing, subchannel and power allocations among multiple users by taking into account the co-channel interference between UL and DL links in FD cellular networks. The BS performs the bidirectional simultaneous information exchange with each transceiver pair over the assigned set of subchannels, and it determines the power level of each transceiver pair. Specifically, we aim to maximize the bidirectional sum-rate of the network, which is formulated as an NP-hard non-convex optimization problem. Due to its combinatorial nature [14] and the existence of the co-channel interference, the optimal solution is not trivial to derive.
Aiming at finding an effective algorithm, we recognize that user pairing and subchannel allocation can be regarded as a multivariate matching process in which the TX users, the RX users, and the subchannels are three sets of players to be matched with each other to achieve the maximum sumrate. This enables us to solve the problem by utilizing the matching theory [15] , [16] , which provides an adaptive, lowcomplexity, and decentralized framework [17] , making it suitable in this situation. However, most the works in the literature discussed mainly two-sided matching between two sets of players such as one-to-one matchings [18] - [20] , many-to-one matchings [21] , [22] , and many-to-many matchings [23] . It is very hard to find an efficient three-sided matching algorithm for our resource allocation problem. We then develop a novel three-sided matching algorithm in this paper.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. We formulate a joint user pairing, subchannel and power allocation problem for a FD-OFDMA cellular network to maximize the overall network's sum-rate. While formulating we also consider the RSI and co-channel interference between UL and DL users. To tackle this NP-hard joint optimization problem, we formulate it as a three-sided matching game in which the TX users, RX users, and subchannels are matched with each other to form different transceiver units. We propose a near-optimal transmitter-subchannel-receiver three-sided matching algorithm (TSRMA) in which a G 1 -stable matching is formed after a small number of iterations. We analyze the proposed matching algorithm in terms of its stability, convergence, complexity, and optimality. Simulation results show that the FD scheme significantly improves the spectrum efficiency compared to the HD scheme. The TSRMA can achieve a performance very close to the upper bound, and performs much better than a random matching algorithm and a two-step two-sided matching algorithm. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model and problem formulation. In Section III, we formulate the joint optimization problem as a three-sided matching problem. The proposed algorithm and the system performance are analyzed in Section IV. In Section V, we present the simulation results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a single-cell full-duplex OFDMA network, as shown in Fig. 1 , consisting of one FD separate-antenna BS [24] , equipped with one receiving antenna a and one transmitting antenna b, and multiple HD users each equipped with a single antenna. We assume that the BS has the full knowledge of channel state information (CSI). Based on the CSI, it allocates a subset of non-overlapping subchannels to the users for bidirectional communication. One uplink (UL) user and one downlink (DL) user are paired to form a fullduplex transceiver unit, in which the UL user acts as a TX user and the DL one acts as a RX user, communicating with the BS simultaneously. 1 Each subchannel is assigned to a transceiver unit only, and a maximum of q s subchannels can be occupied by one transceiver unit. Let K SC = {1, 2, · · · , K } denote the set of subchannels, M T = {1, 2, · · · , M} the set of UL TX users, N R = {1, 2, · · · , N} the set of DL RX users, and T X i , R X j a transceiver unit consisting of T X i and R X j . We consider a block fading channel, for which the channel remains constant within a slot, but varies independently from one to another. The channel coefficient from antenna b of BS to R X j , and that from T X i to antenna a, over subchannel k are denoted by h k,b, j and h k,i,a , respectively. The residual selfinterference coefficient after interference cancellation from antenna b to antenna a, and the co-channel interference coefficient from user i to user j , over subchannel k are denoted by h k,b,a and h k,i, j , respectively. All the UL and DL channels are Rayleigh fading channels, and can be measured through channel feedback or the pilot signals sent by the users. Thus, for T X i , R X j over subchannel k, denoted by SC k , the received signal at antenna a of the BS consists of the signal transmitted by T X i , the residual self interference from antenna b, and noise:
where p u,i,k is the transmitted power of T X i over SC k , p s, j,k is the transmitted power of the BS to R X j over SC k , g i,a ∼ D i,a −β and g b,a ∼ D b,a −β are, respectively, the propagation loss from T X i to antenna a and from antenna b to antenna a. D i,a and D a,b denote, respectively, the distance between T X i and antenna a, and that between antenna a and antenna b. β denotes the decay factor. x i and x j are the transmitted information symbols of unit energy from T X i to the BS and from the BS to R X j , respectively. n i denotes the AWGN with zero mean and variance σ n 2 . Similarly, the received signal at R X j consists of the useful signal from the BS, the co-channel interference sent by T X i , and the noise item. It can then be written as
where
are, respectively, the propagation loss from T X i to R X j and from antenna b to R X j . d i, j and D b, j are, respectively, the distance between T X i and R X j , and that between antenna b and R X j . n j denotes the AWGN with zero mean and variance σ n 2 . The sum-rate of UL-DL transmission of a transceiver unit T X i , R X j over subchannel SC k ∈ K SC (also regarded as the transceiver unit's utility), with i ∈ M T and j ∈ N R , can be expressed as
where η is the interference cancellation coefficient. For convenience, we define a M × N TX-RX matrix ϒ where the binary entry υ i, j denotes whether T X i is paired with R X j . Similarly, we introduce a M × K TX-subchannel matrix where the binary entry γ i,k denotes whether SC k is allocated to T X i . Only when both υ i, j = 1 and γ i,k = 1 hold, T X i and R X j are paired with each other, and subchannel k is allocated to the user pair T X i , R X j . Our objective is to maximize the sum-rate of the system by jointly optimizing the pairing variables {γ i,k , υ i, j } and the transmitted power { p s, j,k , p u,i,k }. The optimization problem can be formulated as:
According to (4b)-(4e), each TX user can only be paired with one RX and vice versa, each subchannel can only be assigned to one transceiver unit, and at most q s subchannels can be assigned to a transceiver unit. The total transmitted power of the BS is smaller than or equal to P s , and the total transmitted power of each TX user is no larger than P u , as shown in constraints (4 f ) and (4g). Due to the log 2 (·) functions and the interference terms in the expression of S k,i, j , problem (4) is a nonlinear optimization problem which is not trivial to convert into a convex optimization problem. In Section III, we will prove that the problem is NP-hard regardless of considering the power allocation. It is thus impossible to find the optimal solution within a polynomial time [25] . To tackle this problem, we will associate it as equivalent to a three-sided matching problem and develop an efficient and low complexity algorithm to find a near-optimal solution to the original problem.
III. THREE-SIDED MATCHING PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present the matching problem formulation. We first prove that the problem in (4) is an NP-hard problem even in the simplest case in which q s = 1 and the power allocation is omitted. To jointly solve this problem, we restrict constraint (4c) in subchannel allocation by setting q s = 1. Note that the restriction approach has been commonly utilized in resource allocation problems [26] , [27] . The BS first assumes that the transmitted power is equally allocated to each subchannel, then (4) can be formulated as an one-toone three-sided matching problem, which can be solved by utilizing the matching theory. Afterwards, DL and UL power allocations are determined by the BS, as will be discussed in Section IV.B.1.
Lemma 1: The problem in (4) is an NP-hard problem.
Proof: See Appendix A.
A. One-to-One Three-Sided Matching Problem
Now we formulate the user pairing and subchannel allocation problem in (4) by utilizing the matching theory. To better describe the mutual relationship between the TX users, RX users, and the subchannels, we make some modifications in the notations, in comparison to the conventional notations used in [15] and [16] .
When the BS allocates a subchannel SC k to one transceiver unit T X i , R X j , we say T X i , R X j and SC k are matched with each other, and they three together compose a matching triple, denoted by Q = T X i , R X j , SC k .
While formulating the problem in (4) into a matching game, the BS assumes that the TX users, RX users and subchannels 2 are all selfish and rational players. To describe the competition behavior and decision process of each player, we assume that in the matching game, each player has preferences over the pairs in
We denote the set of preference lists of the TX users, RX users, and subchannels as:
where P (T X i ),P R X j ,and P (SC k ) are the preference lists of T X i , R X j , and SC k , respectively. The preference list of each TX user, RX user or subchannel is actually set by the BS according to the CSI, i.e., the order of preference is based on the sum-rate of each potential matching triple presented in equation (3) . For example, the relations of preference for any T X i over N R × K SC can be represented using the following expression:
which means that T X i prefers the RX-subchannel pair R X j , SC k to R X j , SC q because the former pair can bring higher utility to it.
In the literature, various properties of preferences have been described and studied for multiple scenarios [28] - [30] , and different characteristics of preference lists may lead to different versions of matching algorithms and stability. In our scenario, we can show that the users' and subchannels' preferences over pairs are strict, mutual, transitive, and inconsistent, as explained below.
• Strict: no player is indifferent between any two pairs of players in the other two parities, i.e., one player might choose either pair. This is guaranteed by the unique sumrate of any transceiver unit over any subchannel based on equation (3).
• Inconsistent: there exists a possibility that T X i prefers R X p to R X q when paired with SC k , but prefers R X q to R X p when paired with SC t , i.e.,
With the notion of the preference list and the matching triple, we can then formulate the optimization problem as a matching problem.
Definition 1: Given a set M T = {1, 2, · · · , M} of TX users, a set N R = {1, 2, · · · , N} of RX users and a set K SC = {1, 2, · · · , K } of subchannels. Each TX user, RX user and subchannel has a complete preference list over the pairs in
, each TX user, RX user and subchannel appears in exactly one triple in ) such that:
where condition 1) indicates that T X i , R X j and subchannel SC k are matched to each other and form a matching triple. Since the numbers of three sets of the agents (i.e, TX users, RX users, or the subchannels) are not necessarily the same, not all the agents will be matched. When an agent is not matched, we say that it is matched to a pair of virtual nodes, as described in conditions 2) and 3). In Fig. 2 we give an illustrative example of a matching in which two TX users, RX users, and subchannels form two matching triples.
We now introduce an indicator matching variable x k,i, j , in which i ∈ {1, · · · , M}, j ∈ {1, · · · , N}, and k ∈ {1, · · · , K }, defined as:
The utility of any triple T X i , R X j , SC k is defined as the sum-rate of this triple, S k,i, j , which is shown in equation (3) . Therefore, we can define the social welfare of the whole network as the total utility of all the matching triples,
Corresponding to the problem in (4), the one-to-one threesided matching problem here can be described as below: we aim to find as many matching triples of TX users, RX users and subchannels as possible that maximize the social welfare U in (8) subject to constraints (4b)-(4i ) and (7) with x k,i, j as variables.
Note that the matching model formulated here is more complicated than the traditional two-sided matching problem, since here three sets of agents, i.e., the TX users, RX users, and the subchannels, are matched jointly. To solve the three-sided matching problem, next we will propose a matching algorithm in Section IV.
IV. PROPOSED MATCHING ALGORITHM
AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES In this section, we propose a low-complexity matching algorithm, TSRMA, in which the BS regards the TX users, RX users and subchannels as three sets of virtual players chasing their own interests.
A. Design of Transmitter-Subchannel-Receiver Matching Algorithm
To describe the proposed matching algorithm, let's first define a subchannel-RX (SR) unit that consists of one subchannel and one RX user. Since we have K subchannels and N RX users in the network, thus, there are N K different SR units. Note that the SR units are not independent since they may contain the same RX user or SC.
As mentioned above, each TX user is a player trying to maximize its own utility by matching with the most profitable SR unit, and each SR unit tends to choose a TX user who can bring the largest utility. Here we simply assume that if a TX user wants to match with one SR unit, it proposes to this SR unit, i.e., the TX user makes an offer to its preferred SR unit. The matching process can be regarded as a process that TX users propose themselves to the SR units, and the proposed SR units have rights to accept or reject the offers.
Before we describe the TSRMA in detail, we first introduce the concept of blocking triples here to explain how the SR units choose among different offers from the proposing TX users.
In the proposing process of the TX users, it is likely that one RX user or subchannel is proposed by two different TX users. When the conflicts happen, the conflicting part, i.e., a RX user, subchannel or an SR unit, has the right to choose one offer and reject all the other ones so as to exclude the existence of the blocking triples, which can be defined as below.
Definition 2: Given a triple Q B = T X i , R X j , SC k , for any member a ∈ T X i , R X j , SC k of this triple, we define L (a) to be the pair formed by removing a from the triple Q B . Under matching , Q B is a blocking triple if it satisfies the following constraints:
Item (i) requires that triple Q B can bring positive utility to its members. Item (ii) implies that if any player a can obtain a higher utility by forming a triple with two players (say, b and c) other than its original partners (a), then a, b and c compose a blocking triple together. This constraint is also applied in the traditional definitions of blocking triples [31] , [32] .
Commonly, a member in a blocking triple Q B is ready to switch its current match with the members in Q B as long as its utility increases by any (arbitrary small) amount. However, there exists one special case in our matching model as below. Note that changing the partners of b and c may reduce the number of matching triples in , leading to the dissatisfaction of the other agents as well as the decrease of the social welfare for the BS. Therefore, it is more realistic that the players would switch their partners only when a significant improvement can be made through the switching. To quantify this observation, we then introduce the notion of the α-blocking triple as below. Note that a similar definition of α-blocking is presented in the two-sided matching [33] .
Definition 3: Given a matching (not stable) and a blocking triple Q B = (a, b, c) , we say Q B is α-blocking if it satisfies:
Item (i) implies that when a proposes to (b, c), if b and c are involved two existing matching triples in , they evaluate their profits as a group. That is, if Q B can improve the total utility of b and c to some degree, it is also an α-blocking triple. Item (ii) implies that if the conflict parts brought by Q B only involve one matching triple, then when Q B brings (α − 1) higher utility compared to the current matching triple, this blocking triple is α-blocking. This is a more general condition compared to Definition 3, since most players wouldn't bother to switch their current partners unless the gain brought by a blocking triple is high enough. Besides, item (i) and (ii) guarantee that the total utility of the players won't decrease, and so does the social welfare of the network.
With all the conditions above, we can then describe the action of each SR unit when it makes decisions among multiple offers. If either R X j or SC k receives more than one offers from the TX users in a matching , it first checks these offers one by one to examine whether there is a blocking triple Q B , and if Q B is also α-blocking, the conflicting part accepts the offer of the members in Q B and rejects its original partner(s) in .
B. Implementation of the Transmitter-Subchannel-Receiver Matching Algorithm
The problem in (4) is solved according to the following steps. The BS first assumes that its transmitted power is equally allocated, then it solves the user-pairing and subchannel allocation problem by executing the TSRMA. Afterwards, the BS determines the power allocation given the matching matrix ϒ and .
1) Power Allocation:
The power allocation problem alone is still a non-convex optimization problem [25] , which is usually hard to solve exactly in a reasonable time. We separate UL and DL power allocation into two steps.
• Step 1: DL power allocation
For an initially equal UL power allocation, the DL power allocation can be solved by utilizing the water-filling algorithm [34] .
where 
2) Description of the Transmitter-Subchannel-Receiver Matching Algorithm: The specific details of our proposed algorithm are described in Algorithm 1, consisting of an initialization phase in Step 1, a preference determination phase in Step 2, a matching phase in Step 3, and a power allocation phase in Step 4. Note that all the steps are not directly performed by the real TX users, RX users, and the subchannels, but by the BS itself. The users and the subchannels mentioned in the TSRMA are merely virtual players whose physical meanings only exist in the TSRMA run by the BS. The BS determines the final solution of user pairing and subchannel allocation according to the outcome of the TSRMA.
In the initialization phase, the BS first allocates the transmitted power equally to the subchannels. It then constructs three matching lists, TX MATCHLIST , RX MATCHLIST , and SC MATCHLIST , respectively, to record whether or not each TX user, RX user and subchannel are matched.
In the preference determination phase, the BS calculates the sum-rate S k,i, j of every potential matching triple T X i , R X j , SC k . For each T X i ∈ M T , the BS gets its preference list by sorting the sum-rate of all the potential matching triples containing T X i .
In the matching phase, multiple iterations are required. In each iteration t, each unmatched T X i starts by proposing to its most preferred SR unit R X j , SC k which has never rejected T X i 's offer in the previous iterations. If the members of an SR unit have never received any offers in the previous iterations and only receive one offer from T X i in iteration t, T X i will be temporarily matched. However, if either R X j or SC k (or both) has already been matched in earlier iterations, R X j , SC k checks whether it can compose an α-blocking triple with T X i . If it can, R X j , SC k keeps this offer and rejects other offers received earlier, otherwise, R X j , SC k rejects T X i and does not change its current partners, thereby eliminating the existence of α-blocking triples. Note that each SR unit that temporarily keeps a TX user's offer is not ready to actually accept the offers, since it still has right to choose a better offer in the next iteration if other TX users also propose to it. The iterations stop when no TX users make new offers to the 
, and SC MATCHLIST = {SC k } K k=1 , respectively, for the unmatched transmitters, receivers, and subchannels;
Phase-II Preference Determination
Set the preference list of each T X i ∈ M T over all the SR units; 
Phase-III Matching; begin while T X i ∈ T X M AT C H L I ST do T X i proposes to its currently most preferred

Phase-IV Power Allocation; begin
The BS performs the UL and DL power allocation according to equation (9)- (12); Terminate with the final matching result and power allocation scheme. SR units, which means that either a TX user is matched to a SR unit, or it has been rejected by all the SR units.
In the power allocation phase, the BS performs the UL and DL power allocation according to equation (9)- (12) .
3) TSRMA v.s. RX-Oriented Algorithm:
The TSRMA gives the TX users the priority to choose RXs and subchannels, and we refer it as a TX-oriented matching algorithm. If the RX users, instead of the TX users, propose to the transmittersubchannel (TS) units consisting of the TX users and the subchannels, then we can form another algorithm, denoted as an RX-oriented algorithm. The TX-oriented scheme may produce different outcomes from the RX-oriented scheme. It was shown in [15] that the outcome of a matching algorithm will benefit the party which makes the proposals more than the party which accepts the proposals. With the TSRMA, the outcome is the best for the TX users, and vice versa. However, the preference lists in our matching model is mutual, so the preferences of the TX users and the RX users are mutually consistent in the order of the sum-rate of the matching triples. Therefore, the outcome of the prementioned schemes are quite similar in terms of the total sum-rate. The comparison of these two schemes is presented in Section V.B.
C. Analysis of the Transmitter-Subchannel-Receiver Matching Algorithm 1) Convergence and Stability:
Given the traditional definitions of blocking triple as in Definition 3, it is proved in [36] that the problem of deciding whether a three-sided matching instance has a stable matching is NP-complete. Thus, there may exist instances of the 3DM problem for which no stable matching is reached.
However, our formulated three-sided matching problem is different from those traditional ones in two main aspects, implying that the traditional concept of blocking triples is not well suitable in this case. First, the preference lists of players from different parties are mutual, so they may have consistent interests in the matching process. Second, in the traditional three-sided matching problems, all three sides of the matching are selfish players chasing as large profits as possible. Nevertheless, in our proposed matching model, it is the BS that executes the TSRMA in which it considers the social welfare as well as the selfish nature of the players.
To better capture the characteristics of our formulated threesided matching problem, we introduce the α-blocking triples as presented in Section III.B. With the concept of α-blocking triples, we can then define the G α -stability as a solution concept in our matching model, and prove that the TSRMA can converge to a G α -stable matching.
Definition 4: A matching is defined as G α -stable if it is not α-blocked by any triple which does not exist in .
Lemma 1: If the TSRMA converges to a matching * , then * is a G α -stable matching. Proof: We prove that the matching won't be α-blocked by any triple through Phase III of the TSRMA. Note that because the TX users have complete and transitive preferences, so at the subsequent steps of the TSRMA, every unmatched T X i ∈ M T is willing to continue to propose to the SR units who haven't rejected its earlier offers, i.e., at each step of the TSRMA, each unmatched TX user is proposing to its most preferred SR unit that hasn't previously rejected it. This procedure guarantees that each TX user will traverse all the achievable SR units in its preference lists. Suppose there is a triple t = T X i , R X j , SC k which doesn't exist in , then there are two possibilities for this. One is that T X i has never proposed to the SR unit R X j , SC k , implying that S t < S T X i , (T X j ) . Another possibility is that at some step of the TSRMA (say, step q), T X i proposes to the SR unit R X j , SC k and is subsequently rejected. This means that this triple t is not a α-blocking triple, because if it was, R X j , SC k would have kept t and rejected its former partners at step q to eliminate the α-blocking triple. Since the members in t are arbitrary, the matching * isn't blocked by any triple, and the matching * is G α -stable.
Theorem 1: The TSRMA converges to a G α -stable matching * after a limited number of iterations. Proof: With the details of the TSRMA in Algorithm 1, we show that this algorithm will end within a limited number of iterations. Since in each iteration, each T X i ∈ M T proposes to its most preferred SR unit which hasn't rejected it in the former iterations, so as the number of the iterations increases, the set of choices for each T X i becomes smaller. There are N K SR units in the network, so the number of proposals that each T X i makes to the SR units is no larger than N K , and thus, the total number of iterations is no more than N K . In the worst case, after each T X i traverses its preference list, it has no new proposals to make, thereby bringing the end of the algorithm. Briefly, either T X i ∈ M T has been matched and no other achievable triples can bring higher profits to it, or T X i is not matched and all the SR units have rejected it, which can be mathematically expressed as:
Therefore, the TSRMA can converge to a final matching * , and according to Lemma 1, if the TSRMA can converge to a matching * , then * is a G α -stable matching.
2) Complexity: Now we discuss the complexity of the TSRMA and compare it with three other algorithms as shown below:
• Optimal Exhaustive Search: This algorithm can be treated as the upper bound of the system performance. The BS lists all the possible solutions of the user pairing and subchannel allocation through exhaustive search. For each potential solution, the BS performs the power allocation, then it selects the optimal solution of joint user pairing, subchannel allocation, and power allocation.
• Random Matching: The TX users are randomly matched with the SR units.
• Two-Step Two-Sided Matching Algorithm (TTMA): User pairing and subchannel allocation are decoupled as two separate two-sided matching problems solved by the BS utilizing the Gale-Shapeley algorithm [15] sequentially. Power allocation is also considered. Theorem 2: The complexity of the optimal exhaustive search is given by
The complexity of the TSRMA is O M N 2 K 2 , and for the random matching algorithm is O (L), with
Proof: For the optimal exhaustive search when M = L, we note that the total number of matching combinations among the TX users, RX users and the subchannels is
Through an exhaustive search among all these matching combinations, we can then obtain the optimal solution of the matching which achieves the largest total sum-rate of the network. Therefore, we can estimate the complexity of the optimal exhaustive search by O N M K M , and similar argument can be made when N = L or K = L. For the TSRMA, the complexity comes from two phases of the algorithm, i.e., the sorting phase and the matching phase. In the sorting phase, each TX user obtains its preference list of N K SR units, in which the complexity is O M N 2 K 2 , while in the matching phase, each TX user will propose as most N K times, resulting in the complexity of O (M N K ) . Therefore, the complexity of the TSRMA is O M N 2 K 2 . For the TTMA, two two-sided matching are performed, each of which consists of a sorting phase and a matching phase. The complexity of the TTMA is then O M N 2 + F K 2 . In the random matching method, the TX users are randomly matched with the SR units, and thus the complexity is proportional to L.
3) Approximation of the STRMA: By performing the proposed STRMA, we guarantee that there is no α-blocking triple in the final matching. However, since the matching problem to be solved is an NP-hard problem, it is likely that there still exist blocking triples in the final matching. Some works have shown a c-factor (c is an absolute constant) approximation to the three gender maximally stable marriage problem (3G-MSM) in terms of the number of blocking triples [37] , in which the minimum number of the stable triples is approximated with same size of all three sets of players. Now we give an upper bound of the number of the blocking triples in our proposed STRMA given α = 1.
Theorem 4: Let * be the final matching resulted by the proposed TSRMA. Without loss of generality, we assume that M > N > K , and thus the number of the blocking triples is upper bounded by
Proof: It has been proven in [37] that for any preference list P, in the matching * , there exists one matching triple (a, b, c) which will not be blocked by at least T = (a 1 , b 1 , c 1 ) . the kth matching triple may contribute at most 3 Then the number of blocking triples for * is upper bounded by
Theorem 4 also provide an estimation on the gap between a super-stable matching [31] (also known as an optimal matching in our scenario) and the G 1 -stable matching found by the TSRMA. Normally, an optimal matching contains M N K stable triples, while the TSRMA can provide at least (M N K − T max ) stable triples. Since the problem in (4) is NP-hard, an optimal solution utilizing any algorithm within polynomial time cannot be achieved, so it is natural that the solution of the TSRMA is not guaranteed to be optimal. In other words, the incentive of the players is to maximize their own utility, so it is likely that some of their choices aren't the best strategies in terms of the social welfare.
4) Discussions on the System Performance:
Due to the interference items in equation (3), it is not trivial to observe the relationship between the total sum-rate and the total BS transmitted power, Ps. We present the remark below based on equation (3) and (4) in Section II.
Remark 1: The total sum-rate increases with the transmitted power of the BS, P s , given the parameters set as P u = 20dBm,
Proof: See Appendix B. This remark can be confirmed by the simulation results in Fig. 3 , as will shown in Section V.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed TSRMA, comparing to the upper bound, the random matching algorithm, and the TTMA, which are described in Section IV.C.2. We also perform an HD-OFDMA resource allocation algorithm to illustrate the advantage of the FD system. In the HD-OFDMA algorithm, the maximum marginal rate subchannel allocation and water-filling power allocation from [38] are performed for UL, while DL power and subchannel allocation are solved via the iterative waterfilling algorithm [35] . The optimal resource allocation for both DL and UL are performed. We assume that the TX users and the RX users are randomly distributed in a square area with the size length of D 0 . We consider a slowly varying block fading channel model with a sufficiently long coherence time. Simulation parameters are listed in Table I based on existing LTE/LTE-Advanced specifications [39] , [40] . Fig. 3 illustrates the total sum-rate as a function of the BS's peak transmitted power P s , with 4 and η = −100dB. We observe that the total sum-rate grows as the BS's peak transmitted power P s increases, which is consistent with the results in Remark 1 in Section IV. For each transceiver unit, since P s is much larger than P u , the DL transmission mainly influences the total sum-rate, which explains why the total sum-rate grows with P s . The performance of the TSRMA is very close to the upper bound obtained from the optimal exhaustive search, and is significantly better than those of the random matching algorithm and the TTMA. The total sumrate of the HD-OFDMA network is also evaluated in Fig. 3 , from which we can see that the FD mode can greatly improve the spectrum efficiency compared to the HD mode.
In Fig. 4 , two matching schemes, i.e., our proposed TX-oriented TSRMA in which the TXs propose to the SR units, and the RX-oriented scheme in which the RXs propose to the TXs and the subchannels, as mentioned in Section IV.B, are compared in terms of the total sum-rate. We set P u = 23dBm, D 0 = 500m, d 0 = 1000m, and η = −100dB. In Fig. 4 , the outcome of these two schemes are almost the same. This makes sense because the preference lists in our matching model are mutual, so the TX users and the RX users may have similar preference lists over the set of matching triples in terms of the sum-rate, which renders them to propose to the same triples. Since the outcome of two prementioned schemes are quite similar, it does not make a great difference whether to utilize the TSRMA or the RX-oriented scheme in terms of the total sum-rate of the network. Fig. 5 shows the total sum-rate as a function of the BS's peak transmitted power P s with the interference cancellation factor η varying from −70dB to −110dB. We P u = 23dBm, D 0 = 500m, and d 0 = 1000m. When η < −90dB, the FD-OFDMA network utilizing the TSRMA outperforms the HD-OFDMA scheme in terms of the total sum-rate. This implies that the interference cancellation factor significantly influences the total sum-rate of the FD system, thus influencing the spectrum efficiency. The total sum-rate as a function of the number of the TX users M and the number of the RX users N, is illustrated in Fig. 6 where P s = 46dBm, P u = 23dBm, D 0 = 500m, and d 0 = 1000m. When K < L, the total sum-rate increases significantly with the number of the TXs (or RXs) due to the growing number of the matching triples. When K > L, the total sum-rate of all the algorithms continues to grow with a slower rate. As M (or N) becomes larger, the gap between the TSRMA and the upper bound gets bigger due to the increasing number of the blocking triples in the outcome of the TSRMA. Therefore, the total sum-rate is greatly influenced by the number of potential matching triples. The larger the number of potential matching triples is, the higher the total sum-rate will be. Fig. 7 shows the total sum-rate as a function of D 0 /d 0 , with M = 4, N = 5, K = 7, P s = 46dBm, and P u = 23dBm. From the curves of both subgraphs, it can be seen that with different values of D 0 and d 0 , the total sumrate decreases as D 0 /d 0 increases. This can be explained by observing the expression of the sum-rate in equation (3) . In a transceiver unit T X i , R X j , the interference of T X i to R X j , i.e., p u,i h k,i, j 2 /d i, j α , is much larger than the noise, i.e., σ n 2 , so the first part of (3) decreases with the value of D b, j /d i, j . The distance between two antennas of the BS is fixed, and thus, the second part of the sum-rate decreases with D i,a . This implies that for maximizing the total network's sum-rate, the BS pairs those users who are close to each other so as to obtain as large total sum-rate as possible. Besides, Fig. 7 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the resource allocation and scheduling problem in an FD-OFDMA wireless network by jointly optimizing the subchannel assignment, uplinkdownlink user pairing, and power allocation to maximize the total sum-rate of the network. By formulating the problem as a one-to-one three-sided matching problem, we proposed a near optimal low-complexity transmitter-subchannel-receiver matching algorithm in which the TX users, RX users, and subchannels can be matched as various matching triples. Through the analysis and extensive simulations, we achieved the following conclusions. To maximize the total sum-rate of the network, the BS should select those TX users and RX users which are close to the BS but relatively far from each other to form transceiver units. The BS should allocate the subchannels which can bring higher sum-rate to the matched transceiver pairs. We also discussed the effect of the total transmitted power of the BS, P s , on the total sumrate of the network. Finally we showed that with a much lower complexity, the TSRMA approached relatively high total sum-rate of the network after a small number of iterations, which is close to the upper bound. The TSRMA also 
performed much better than the HD-OFDMA scheme, random matching algorithm, and the TTMA.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Lemma 1: First let's define the decision problem corresponding to (4). Then we reduce this decision problem to a 3-dimensional matching problem (3-DM problem). Since the 3-DM problem has been proven to be NP-comlete [36] , [41] , the decision problem of (4) is also NP-complete. Thus, the problem in (4) is an NP-hard problem [42] . a) Let's first obtain the decision problem of (4). Let M T , N R , and K SC be three disjoint sets of TX users, RX users, and the subchannels, respectively. We have |M T | = M, |N R | = N, and |K SC | = K . Let Q be a collection of ordered triples Q ⊆ K SC ×M T ×N R , where Q i = SC k , T X i , R X j ∈ Q . According to (3), the sum-rate of any triple Q i can be set as S Q i . To be convenient, set L = min {M, N, K }. Now we need to determine whether there exists a set
S Q i ≥ λ, where any Q i ∈ Q and Q j ∈ Q do not contain the same components. b) Next let's present a traditional 3-DM decision problem.
Let M T , N R , and K SC be three disjoint sets of TX users, RX users and subchannels, respectively. Let Q be a collection of ordered triples Q ⊆ K SC × M T × N R . Then Q ⊆ Q is a 3-DM if the followings hold: 1) Q = L; 2)for any two distinct triples (SC i , T X i , R X i ) ∈ Q and SC i , T X j , R X j ∈ Q , we have i = j . It has been shown that a 3-DM decision problem is an NP-complete problem even in the special case that |M| = |N| = |K | [14] . c) We can then show that the problems in a) and b) are equivalent. For the decision problem formulated in a), if let λ go to an infinite negative, the decision problem of (4) can be transformed into a 3-DM decision problem, i.e., the decision problem in a) can be reduced to a 3-DM decision problem. Therefore, the decision problem in a) is NP-complete, and the corresponding problem (4) is NP-hard. 
